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IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT?:
CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP V.
TROICE AND THE APPLICABILITY
OF THE SECURITIES LITIGATION
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT
JOHN W. MESSICK

*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the “financial empire” of Allen Stanford became insolvent
and the SEC revealed that Stanford International Bank (SIB) and
other investment entities Stanford operated were part of a multi1
billion dollar Ponzi scheme. Stanford fraudulently induced investors
into purchasing certificates of deposit (CDs) by promising high rates
of return and misrepresenting that the CDs were backed by safe,
2
liquid securities. When the fraud finally collapsed, it cost investors
billions of dollars. Investors subsequently filed a class action under
state law against the law firm of Chadbourne & Parke LLP, which
3
allegedly assisted Stanford in perpetuating the fraud.
However, the state law class action is threatened by the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which precludes state
law class actions brought “in connection with” the purchase or sale of
4
5
covered securities. In Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, the
Supreme Court will decide whether SLUSA applies here because SIB
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law.
1. See Joint Appendix, Vol. II at 427, 434, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, Nos. 1279, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. May 3, 2013).
2. See Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 2011).
3. Brief for Troice Respondents in Opposition at 3, 6–7, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v.
Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Brief of Respondents]. The
Supreme Court is hearing this case alongside an appeal involving another state law class action
against the law firm Proskauer Rose LLP, also alleged to have assisted Stanford in his Ponzi
scheme, as well as a related appeal involving SIB’s insurance brokers. See infra note 16.
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1)–(2) (West 2013).
5. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, No. 12-79 (U.S. argued Oct. 7, 2013).

MESSICK 1.28.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

126

1/28/2014 1:36 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 9

marketed the CDs by misrepresenting that they were backed by
securities. If the Court finds that the misrepresentations were not “in
connection with” the purchase or sale of securities, the state law class
action will stand. However, if the “in connection with” requirement is
met, then SLUSA preempts the state law class action, and the
complaint must be dismissed.
Chadbourne presents the Court with the opportunity to clarify the
meaning of “in connection with”—a phrase lower courts have
6
struggled to interpret consistently. Because SIB only misrepresented
its holdings in securities—not its transactions in them—the Court will
likely rule that SLUSA is inapplicable, and thus that investors may
proceed with their class action in state court against Chadbourne &
Parke.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Petitioner is the law firm of Chadbourne & Parke LLP, which
is alleged to have aided and abetted SIB in its fraudulent investment
7
scheme by helping SIB avoid regulatory oversight. Since the late
1980s, R. Allen Stanford operated a vast financial services “empire,”
consisting of numerous financial entities in the United States and
8
overseas. One such entity was the Antigua-based SIB, whose primary
business was marketing and selling CDs, of which it had sold $7.2
9
billion by 2009. The reality, however, was that several Stanford
entities were nothing more than a front for a global Ponzi scheme,
whereby SIB used the proceeds from sales of CDs to pay interest on
10
existing CDs. In order to avoid regulatory oversight from the United
States and other countries, in 2005 Stanford hired Tom Sjoblom, who
11
was then a partner at Chadbourne & Parke. Among other things,
Sjoblom sent a letter to the SEC arguing that the SEC lacked
regulatory oversight of SIB’s operations, a statement he allegedly
12
knew to be false.
6. See John M. Wunderlich, “Uniform” Standards for Securities Class Actions, 80 TENN.
L. REV. 167, 209 (2012) (discussing the widely divergent outcomes in circuit courts’ rulings
regarding SLUSA).
7. See Joint Appendix Vol. II, supra note 1, at 455.
8. See id. at 427–28.
9. See id. at 430.
10. See Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 2011).
11. See Joint Appendix Vol. II, supra note 1, at 455.
12. See id. at 457. In a letter to the SEC, Sjoblom cited case law holding that the SEC did
not have regulatory authority over CDs issued by foreign banks when the government of that
foreign country provided sufficient regulatory oversight, which Sjoblom claimed was the case in
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Eventually the fraud collapsed, causing thousands of investors to
13
lose their savings. In addition to a suit by the SEC, two groups of
Louisiana residents (the Roland plaintiffs) brought suit in state courts
against various individuals and entities operated by Stanford for
14
making fraudulent representations about the quality of the CDs.
Similarly, two separate complaints were brought under Texas law in
the District Court for the Northern District of Texas by the
15
Respondents here (the Troice plaintiffs). The first complaint named
SIB’s insurance brokers as defendants; the second named the law
16
firms that assisted SIB in evading regulatory oversight as defendants.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases
to the Northern District of Texas, which chose one case, Roland v.
17
Green, to test the applicability of SLUSA. The district court
dismissed the case because it found SIB’s investment scheme
depended upon the assurance that the investments were backed by
18
securities, and thus the class action was precluded under SLUSA.
The Roland and Troice plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit,
19
challenging the district court’s dismissal.

Antigua. Id.
13. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 4.
14. See id. at 4–5. The defendants named in the Roland plaintiffs’ complaint did not appeal
the court decision against them, and thus any issues specific to their case are not before the
Supreme Court.
15. See id. at 6.
16. See id. at 6–7. In addition to Chadbourne & Parke, the Petitioners, the complaint also
named the law firm of Proskauer Rose LLP as a defendant. These complaints both arise out of
the actions of the same partner, Sjoblom, who left Chadbourne to become a partner at
Proskauer, where he allegedly continued to assist SIB in evading regulation. See Joint Appendix
Vol. II, supra note 1, at 487–88. Proskauer appealed an adverse Fifth Circuit decision and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case as a consolidated matter with the case
discussed here. See Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88 (U.S. argued Oct. 7, 2013).
17. See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 509–10 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, sub nom
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 977 (2013).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 511.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. PSLRA, SLUSA, and Supreme Court Precedent
Chardbourne concerns the meaning of the phrase “in connection
20
with the purchase or sale of a covered security” in determining
21
SLUSA’s preclusive scope. This language is derived from Rule 10b-5,
which was promulgated in 1942 under § 10(b) of the 1934 Securities
22
Rule 10b-5 “broadly prohibits deception,
Exchange Act.
misrepresentation, and fraud ‘in connection with the purchase or sale
23
of any security.’” Although enforcement of the statute is explicitly
granted to the SEC, the Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized
24
an implied private right of action. In order to limit vexatious
securities litigation while maintaining a cause of action for deserving
25
plaintiffs, the Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores
limited recovery under Rule 10b-5 litigation to parties who actually
26
purchased or sold securities. Thus, “holders” of securities—those who
are fraudulently induced into waiting to purchase or sell a security—
27
cannot bring claims under Rule 10b-5.
Similarly, in enacting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) in 1995, Congress was also motivated by the need to
balance providing remedies for deserving plaintiffs with preventing
28
onerous lawsuits. This legislation, which implemented various
29
30
limitations on covered class actions involving covered securities,
unintentionally caused an influx of class action securities fraud claims
in state court by virtue of making state law more attractive to
20. A “covered security” is one that is traditionally listed on a national exchange. See
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006).
21. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (West 2013).
22. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 78.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014).
24. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971).
25. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
26. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 80–81.
27. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 754–55 (holding that plaintiffs could not bring suit
because they were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities). The Blue Chip Stamps Court
emphasized that suits brought by holders of securities were especially prone to abuse. See Dabit,
547 U.S. at 71 (discussing Blue Chip Stamps).
28. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 81.
29. Specifically, PSLRA provided for limits on damages and attorney’s fees, sanctions for
frivolous litigation, a stay of discovery following a motion to dismiss, restrictions on lead
plaintiffs, and a safe harbor provision for forward-looking statements. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u–4
(West 2013).
30. A “covered class action” is one in which damages are being sought by fifty or more
individuals. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 83.
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31

plaintiffs than federal law. Thus, to maintain “the congressional
preference for [having] national standards for securities class action
32
lawsuits involving nationally traded securities,” and to prevent any
one state from unduly burdening the market for nationally traded
33
34
securities, Congress passed SLUSA in 1998.
35
The “core provision” of the SLUSA provides:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law
of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State
or Federal court by any private party alleging . . . a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with
the purchase or sale of a covered security; or . . . that the defendant
used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
36
security.

Covered class actions brought under state law that meet the
requirements of SLUSA are removed to federal court, where they are
37
subject to dismissal. However, SLUSA does not actually prevent a
plaintiff from asserting any cause of action under state law; “[i]t
simply denies plaintiffs the right to use the class-action device to
38
vindicate certain claims.”

31. See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3 (1998) (commenting that after the passage of PSLRA,
“there appear[ed] to be a ‘substitution effect’ whereby plaintiff's counsel file[d] state court
complaints when the underlying facts appear[d] not to satisfy new, more stringent federal
pleading requirements, or otherwise [sought] to avoid the substantive or procedural provisions
of [PSLRA]”); see also Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 303 (1998) (discussing empirical studies
of class action fraud claims after PSLRA and noting “[t]he relative stability in overall filing
activity masked a significant shift in litigation from federal to state court”).
32. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87.
33. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 5 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that “a single state can
impose the risks and costs of its pecular [sic] litigation system on all national issuers [of
securities]”).
34. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82.
35. Id. at 83.
36. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2013).
37. See id. § 78bb(f)(2).
38. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87. Although SLUSA does not deny any individual plaintiff the right
to assert any cause of action under state law, in many instances a class action is the only
economically viable means by which plaintiffs may pursue a fraud claim. See Wunderlich, supra
note 6, at 171 (2012) (discussing how plaintiffs who have suffered relatively small losses
individually can bear the cost of expensive securities fraud litigation by aggregating their claims
in a class action suit).
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B. Dabit and the Meaning of “In Connection With” Under SLUSA
39

In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, the
Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the phrase “in connection
40
with” in SLUSA for the first time. In Dabit, former Merrill Lynch
brokers alleged that the investment bank had breached its fiduciary
duty and covenant of good faith by providing the brokers with
41
misleading research about the stocks held by their clients. Managers
at the bank supposedly instructed analysts to issue overly optimistic
reports of the stocks’ outlook; the brokers in turn told their own
clients to hold the shares longer than the clients would have without
42
these reports. When the prices of these stocks eventually fell, clients
43
left the bank, causing the brokers to lose commission fees. The
brokers filed a class action against Merrill Lynch under Oklahoma
law; Merrill Lynch responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing
44
that SLUSA precluded the class action.
The Supreme Court overruled a Second Circuit holding that fraud
is only “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security if actual
45
purchasers or sellers allege they were injured by the fraud. The
Court highlighted that it had previously held, regarding the phrase “in
connection with” under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, that it was enough
that a fraud “coincide” with a securities transaction, regardless of
46
whether the plaintiff was party to that transaction. Finding that
Congress must have been aware of how both the Court and the SEC
had been interpreting “in connection with” in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
when enacting SLUSA, the Court reasoned that Congress must have
intended the phrase to have the same meaning there as it did in §

39. 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
40. Id. at 71.
41. Id. at 75.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 76.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 76–77. Thus, under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, because holders of
securities (rather than purchasers or sellers) were alleging injury, SLUSA did not apply. Id. The
Second Circuit reached its decision by adopting the purchaser-seller requirement from Blue
Chip Stamps. See id. However, in overturning the ruling of the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court found that Blue Chip Stamps addressed the private scope of action under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, not the meaning of “in connection with,” which the Court viewed as a separate
concept. See id. at 81.
46. See id. at 85 (“The requisite showing . . . is deception ‘in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security,’ not deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller.” (quoting United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997))).
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47

10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In addition, considering the policy
48
considerations underlying SLUSA, and noting “[t]he magnitude of
the federal interest in protecting the integrity and efficient operation
49
of the market for nationally traded securities,” the Court ruled that
50
“in connection with” should be interpreted broadly. Thus, under
SLUSA, “it is enough that the fraud alleged ‘coincide’ with a
51
securities transaction,” to preclude a state law class action. In other
words, to invoke SLUSA preclusion, it is not necessary to show that
an “identifiable purchaser or seller” of securities was deceived;
instead, one must only show “deception in connection with the
52
purchase or sale of any security.”
C. Lower Courts Struggle to Interpret Dabit
Courts have had difficulty in assigning a precise meaning to “in
connection with,” and as a result many circuit courts have crafted
53
their own language to describe the requirement. For example, in
54
Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch (IPM), a group of
investors alleged that a pension fund had misappropriated their
55
investments for personal use. The investors claimed that Merrill
Lynch was liable for their loss under Florida law because the
investment bank had permitted the fund to hold itself out as Merrill
Lynch’s business partner, and because the investment bank had failed
to prevent the fund from misappropriating money from the investors’
56
accounts. Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss, arguing that SLUSA
57
precluded the plaintiffs’ claims. The Second Circuit held that the
“coincide” requirement was met if the plaintiffs were induced into
investing with the defendants because the plaintiffs believed they
were investing in covered securities, or if the “fraudulent scheme . . .

47. See id. (“Congress can hardly have been unaware of the broad construction adopted by
both this Court and the SEC when it imported the key phrase—‘in connection with the purchase
or sale’—into SLUSA’s core provision.”).
48. See id. at 86 (discussing how a narrow interpretation of the phrase would be contrary
to SLUSA’s purpose).
49. Id. at 78.
50. Id. at 85–86.
51. Id. at 85 (quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651).
52. Id.
53. See Wunderlich, supra note 6, at 209 (discussing the widely divergent outcomes in
circuit court rulings regarding SLUSA).
54. 546 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008).
55. Id. at 1342.
56. Id. at 1342–43.
57. Id. at 1344.
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coincided with and depended upon the purchase or sale of [covered]
58
securities.” The court found that the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that
the defendant’s fraud had induced them to invest with the pension
fund. Because of this, the court ruled that their claims were “in
connection with the purchase or sale” of securities, and so SLUSA
59
applied.
The Ninth Circuit took a slightly different approach in Madden v.
60
Cowen & Co. In Madden, the plaintiffs, former shareholders of a
closely-held corporation, filed a class action against an investment
bank that advised them to sell their company to a publicly traded
corporation in exchange for shares of the publicly traded
61
corporation. When the publicly traded corporation’s stock price
plummeted a few months later, it greatly diminished the value of the
shares the plaintiffs had received. The plaintiffs filed suit against the
62
investment bank for professional negligence under California law.
Finding that a fraud is “in connection with” covered securities if the
“fraud and stock sale coincide or are more than tangentially related,”
the Ninth Circuit ruled that SLUSA precluded the plaintiffs’ action
63
because Cowen’s investment advice met this standard.
Adding an additional layer of complexity, lower courts have taken
different approaches to determine whether a class action is precluded
under SLUSA when there is a disconnect between the fraudulent
representations made to the plaintiffs and the actual purchase or sale
64
of covered securities. In these “feeder fund” cases, the defendant
fraudulently induces the investors to purchase some type of
uncovered financial product, which is related in some way to

58. Id. at 1349.
59. Id.
60. 576 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009).
61. Id. at 962.
62. Id. at 962–63.
63. Id. at 966 (quoting Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002)). In
addition to the Second and Ninth Circuits, several other circuit courts have addressed the
meaning of “coincides with,” each creating a slightly different test. See e.g. Romano v. Kazacos,
609 F.3d 512, 522 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding “coincide” to mean “necessarily allege,” “necessarily
involve,” or “rest on” the purchase or sale of covered securities); Siepel v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
526 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2008) (interpreting “coincide” as meaning “related to” the
purchase or sale of covered securities); Gavin v. AT&T Corp., 464 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2006)
(defining “coincide” to mean “‘involving nationally traded securities’” (quoting Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006))).
64. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 514 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Chadbourne
& Parke LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 977 (2013).
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65

transactions involving covered securities. The most common method
of analyzing fraudulent schemes structured as feeder funds is the
“purpose approach,” which considers the purpose of the fraudulent
66
investment scheme. Under this analysis, a court must decide if “the
uncovered securities (feeder funds) ‘were created for the purpose of
67
investing in [covered] securities.’” If the fraud “inevitably included
68
the purchase and sale of covered securities,” then SLUSA applies.
However, there is no categorical rule for analyzing cases under the
69
purpose approach. Some courts have looked to whether the purpose
70
of the fund itself was to invest in covered securities, while others
have examined the purpose of the relationship between the investor
71
and the defendant.
Despite the different meanings courts have assigned to “in
connection with” and the different approaches they have taken to
analyzing feeder fund cases, there is one point on which they have
been largely in agreement: that the economic realities of the
investment scheme determine whether SLUSA is triggered,
72
regardless of how the fraud is described in the pleadings.

65. See id. at 516–17.
66. See id. Other approaches include the “product approach,” which simply looks at
whether the product that was purchased was a covered security, and the “separation approach,”
which considers the degree of separation between the business entities that separate the fraud
and the securities transaction. See id. at 514–15.
67. See id. at 517 (quoting Newman v. Family Mgmt. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 299, 312
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
68. See id. (quoting In re Beacon Assocs. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 386, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
69. The purpose approach cases described in Roland do not adopt the term “purpose
approach.” Rather, the phrase was coined by the Fifth Circuit to describe a general trend in the
analysis of multilayered investment schemes. See id.
70. See, e.g., Newman, 748 F. Supp. at 312 (noting that misrepresentations about noncovered interests in a partnership may still be “in connection with” covered securities under
SLUSA if the partnership was created for the purpose of investing in covered securities);
Beacon Assocs., 745 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
71. See, e.g., Rowinski v. Saloman Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“[T]he action arises from the broker/investor relationship, the ‘very purpose’ of which is
‘trading in securities.’” (quoting Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d
Cir. 1985))); Levinson v. PSCC Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-00269 (PCD), 2009 WL 5184363, at *11
(D. Conn. Dec. 23, 2009) (noting that the agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants “was
formed for the purpose of investing Plaintiffs’ funds in securities”); Backus v. Conn. Cmty.
Bank, N.A., No. 3:09-CV-1256, 2009 WL 5184360, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009) (“The . . .
agreement governing the parties' dealings states that the relationship was created for the
purpose of investment in securities[.]”).
72. See Wunderlich, supra note 6, at 184 (noting that “federal courts have unanimously
said that the substance, not the form, of the complaint controls for purposes of SLUSA
preclusion”).
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IV. HOLDING
Reversing the decision of the district court, the Fifth Circuit found
that the misrepresentations made by SIB and Chadbourne & Parke
were not “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security”
because they were “not more than tangentially related” to those
transactions. Therefore, SLUSA did not apply and the state law class
73
action against Chadbourne & Parke could proceed. In determining
that “‘not more than tangentially related’ to covered securities” was
the standard by which the investors’ complaints should be evaluated,
the court first considered whether a plaintiff or defendant-oriented
analysis was more appropriate for determining whether SLUSA
74
applied. Under a plaintiff-oriented test, SLUSA applies if the
plaintiffs were “induced” into investing in non-covered securities
because they “thought they were investing in covered securities or
75
invested because of (representations about) covered securities.” A
defendant-oriented test, on the other hand, looks to whether the
defendants’ scheme “coincided and depended upon” transactions
involving covered securities by examining “whether the defendants’
fraudulent scheme would have been successful without the
76
(representations about) securities.”
The court decided that the plaintiff-oriented inquiry’s
“inducement” requirement was misguided because it “import[ed]
causation into a test [from Dabit] whose language (“coincide”)
77
specifically disclaim[ed]” causation. Because of this, the defendantoriented analysis was more faithful to the Supreme Court’s “coincides
78
with” requirement. However, the court reasoned that the defendantoriented “depended upon” language created too stringent a standard,
and that “more than tangentially related” was the best formulation of
79
the requirement. The Fifth Circuit found that this test best accounted
73. Roland, 675 F.3d at 523–24.
74. Id. at 518–19. Although Chadbourne & Parke are the named defendants, SLUSA
preclusion turns on whether SIB’s misrepresentations to the investors were “in connection with”
the purchase or sale of a covered security. Thus, the defendant-oriented test must view the
situation from SIB’s perspective.
75. Id. at 519 (quoting Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1349
(11th Cir. 2008)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. (“The defendant-oriented perspective . . . is more faithful to the Court's
statement that ‘[t]he requisite showing . . . is deception in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security, not deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller.’” (quoting Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006))).
79. Id. at 520 (quoting Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 996 (9th Cir. 2009)). The
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for the Supreme Court’s instruction that “in connection with” not be
construed so broadly that SLUSA precludes every common law
80
action for fraud brought under state law.
Because SIB’s fraud had been a multi-layered feeder fund, it was
necessary for the court to examine the “actualities of the alleged
81
schemes.” Although SIB had claimed that the CDs were attractive
investments because they were backed by covered securities, this was
one of many misrepresentations made to the investors designed to
82
inveigle them into purchasing the CDs. Assuming the perspective of
SIB, misrepresentations about covered securities were “merely
tangentially related” to the fraudulent scheme, and the “heart, crux,
and gravamen” of the scheme was that the CDs were a superior
investment for a multitude of reasons, not just because they were
83
backed by covered securities. As a result, the Fifth Circuit held that
the fraudulent schemes of SIB were “not more than tangentially
related to the purchase or sale of covered securities” and therefore
84
did not trigger SLUSA preclusion.
Finally, the court noted that the allegations against the law firm
defendants, including Chadbourne & Parke, were different because
the investors did not claim that the law firms made any
85
misrepresentations to them. Rather, the law firms allegedly aided
and abetted SIB’s fraud by misrepresenting the SEC’s ability to
regulate SIB, and had these misrepresentations not been made, the
86
harm to plaintiffs would not have occurred. Nonetheless, the court
found that the misrepresentations were “not more than tangentially
related to the purchase or sale of covered securities,” and so SLUSA
87
was not triggered. Chadbourne & Parke appealed and the Supreme

court found that “depended upon” was too high of a requirement for SLUSA to apply because
other circuits had generally relied on less restrictive standards in formulating their own tests. See
id. (“The Sixth Circuit . . . seemed to suggest that while a claim that ‘depended on’ a securities
transaction was sufficient, there were other connections that would also meet the ‘coincide’
requirement.”).
80. Id. (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002)).
81. Id. at 521.
82. Id. at 522.
83. See id. These other reasons included that the investments would yield a higher rate of
return, were more liquid than other investments, and were subject to regulatory oversight.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 523.
86. See id. at 523–24.
87. Id. at 524.
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88

V. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Argument
Chadbourne & Parke first contends that, pursuant to Supreme
Court precedent, the “in connection with” requirement must be
89
construed broadly, both in SLUSA and in § 10(b). Although a
narrow reading of that requirement is textually possible, the Court
90
rejected such a reading in Dabit. Furthermore, a broad reading of “in
connection with” in SLUSA is supported by Congress’s policy
objective: to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing PSLRA by filing
91
securities class actions in state court. However, even if the “in
connection with” requirement is read narrowly, Respondents’
complaint meets this requirement because SIB misrepresented that
the CDs were a safe and liquid investment, backed by a portfolio of
92
covered securities, when in fact they were not. That the
misrepresentations concerning covered securities were made at a
different time from any of SIB’s transactions in securities is irrelevant,
because the misstatements and transactions were part of a common
93
fraudulent scheme.
Chadbourne & Parke next argues that the Fifth Circuit’s decision
is flawed for three reasons. First, Chadbourne & Parke claims that,
contrary to the lower court’s ruling, SIB’s misrepresentations were
94
crucial to the fraudulent scheme. Only misrepresentations about
covered securities could answer investors’ questions about how SIB
was able to promise high rates of return on safe, liquid investments,
and these characteristics were the most important factor in marketing
95
the CDs to SIB’s investors. Second, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that
88. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 977 (2013); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at i, No. 12-79 (U.S. July 18, 2012).
89. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, No. 12-79 (U.S. May 3,
2013).
90. Id. at 24–45 (“[T]his Court has long rejected that narrow interpretation of § 10(b)’s ‘in
connection with’ language. Instead, ‘when this Court has sought to give meaning to th[at] phrase
in the context of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it has espoused a broad interpretation.’” (quoting
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006))).
91. Id. at 25–26.
92. Id. at 28–30.
93. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, No. 12-79 (U.S.
Aug. 18, 2013).
94. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 34–35.
95. Id. at 35–36.
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SLUSA preclusion does not apply because SIB’s misrepresentations
concerning covered securities were “but one of a host of
96
(mis)representations” is not textually supported by SLUSA. By the
terms of the statute, if a complaint alleges “a misrepresentation” in
connection with covered securities, SLUSA applies, and it is irrelevant
whether the defendants made misrepresentations about things other
97
than covered securities. Under the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning,
Chadbourne & Parke claims, plaintiffs could avoid SLUSA
preemption by adding allegations of fraud unrelated to covered
securities to their complaints, so that the fraud actually involving
98
covered securities was only one of several misrepresentations. This
would undermine the purpose of SLUSA, which was to ensure that
plaintiffs do not side-step PSLRA by bringing class actions in
99
connection with covered securities in state court.
Finally,
Chadbourne & Parke argues that the Fifth Circuit’s test of
determining the “heart,” “crux,” or “gravamen” of a fraud to decide if
SLUSA applies is overly subjective, and courts will struggle to apply
100
it.
B. Respondents’ Argument
Respondents first argue that the complaints do not allege any
material misrepresentation concerning covered securities. The CDs
were not covered securities, nor were their returns tied in any way to
the performance of covered securities. Therefore, their sale did not
101
convey any ownership interest in covered securities. Furthermore,
Respondents do not allege that Chadbourne & Parke made any
representations to them directly, but rather that Chadbourne & Parke
102
misrepresented to the SEC that SIB was not subject to regulation.
Next, Respondents reject Chadbourne & Parke’s argument that
because SIB claimed it owned a portfolio of liquid assets, SLUSA was
103
triggered. First, because SIB was a foreign bank and claimed its
portfolio contained “highly marketable securities issued by stable
national governments, strong multinational companies, and major
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2006)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 40.
Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 18.
Id.
Id. at 21.
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international banks,” there was no reason for individual investors to
believe that their individual investments would lead SIB to purchase
104
securities traded on American exchanges. Second, Respondents
argue that even if SIB had explicitly stated it owned covered
securities, the “in connection with” requirement of SLUSA would not
105
be satisfied. Such a claim would merely relate to the ownership of
securities and would not coincide with any actual transaction; thus it
would not be “in connection with” the “purchase or sale” of any
106
securities. This construction makes sense in light of Congress’s goal
in enacting § 10(b), which was not to punish all deceptive conduct, but
rather to regulate only certain transactions in national securities
markets. SIB’s misrepresentations did not introduce dishonesty into
national securities markets, and thus did not interfere with the
107
congressional purpose behind the legislation.
Respondents finally argue that SLUSA does not encompass a
situation in which defendants fraudulently induce plaintiffs to
purchase CDs by falsely promising to purchase covered securities
108
with the proceeds of the CDs. Respondents claim that Chadbourne
& Parke advances an unprecedented construction of the “in
connection with” requirement, one that would greatly broaden the
109
preclusive effects of SLUSA. Noting that the Court warned against
110
reading “in connection with” too broadly, Respondents assert that
the construction Chadbourne & Parke advocates limits state law class
actions at the same time as expanding the ability of the federal
111
government and private citizens to bring suits under Rule 10b-5.
This would undermine Congress’s goal of limiting class actions
involving nationally traded securities while simultaneously respecting
112
state authority to regulate non-national securities.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 26 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997)).
Id. at 30–31.
Id.
Id. at 41 (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002)).
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43–45.
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VI. ANALYSIS
Chadbourne and the related cases before the Court present an
opportunity for the Court to not only further elucidate the “coincides
with” requirement set forth in Dabit, but also to address the
applicability of SLUSA in cases involving complex feeder fund
investment schemes, such as the one at hand (or those operated by
113
Bernie Madoff). Although Dabit clarified that SLUSA preclusion
extends to holders of securities, lower courts nonetheless have
struggled to define and consistently apply the “coincides with”
114
115
requirement. As judicial uncertainty increases the cost of capital,
the Court should try to create a bright line rule.
A. Refining Dabit
At the outset, the Court should find that SIB’s misrepresentations
were crucial to the success of the fraud: Stanford told his brokers to
market the CDs by emphasizing that they were highly liquid because
116
they were backed by securities. Yet, no securities transaction took
place (or purportedly took place) as a direct result of plaintiffs’
investments with SIB. The Court affirmed in Dabit that SLUSA
requires that the misrepresentation be “in connection with” the
purchase or sale of a security and that the fraud “coincide” with a
securities transaction by some party. Here, the relevant
misrepresentations made by SIB were about securities it purportedly
already held. Thus, the issue is not whether SLUSA would preclude a
class action by plaintiffs holding securities—Dabit makes it clear that
it would. Rather, this case is about whether defendant’s holding of (or
misrepresenting they held) covered securities can invoke SLUSA
preclusion. A good rule for such cases would be that when a
defendant makes a misrepresentation about securities it holds—not

113. See, e.g., Newman v. Family Mgmt. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(adjudicating a class action brought against a “sub-feeder” fund that invested with Madoff’s
“feeder funds”); Levinson v. PSCC Services, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-00269 (PCD), 2009 WL 5184363,
at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 2009) (considering a class action brought against a retirement fund that
invested with Madoff).
114. See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2012) (remarking that Dabit’s
“coincides with” requirement is “not particularly descriptive”), cert. granted sub nom.
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 977 (2013); Wunderlich, supra note 6, at 210
(noting the need for either the Court or Congress to take action to clarify SLUSA).
115. See Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 962 (1993) (discussing how
uncertainty and a lack of bright line rules increases the cost of capital).
116. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 32.
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securities transactions it plans or promises to make as a result of the
plaintiff’s investment—SLUSA should not apply.
At times, it may be difficult to determine when a defendant’s
misrepresentations meet this standard. For example, the investors
here believed that SIB had previously made transactions in covered
securities (because SIB claimed to hold a portfolio of such securities)
and probably believed SIB would eventually purchase covered
securities in the future with proceeds from the sale of CDs. And at
first glance this seems like a misrepresentation “in connection with”
the purchase or sale of covered securities. The distinguishing factor
here, however, is that an investor is unlikely to have believed that SIB
would engage in a securities transaction as a result of that investor’s
individual purchase of a CD. Because of this, SIB’s misrepresentations
are more accurately characterized as concerning its holdings in
117
securities, rather than its transactions in them. That the purported
securities transactions occurred in the same time frame, and may have
118
occurred as part of a “common scheme” as Respondents argue, does
not change the fact that, from the perspective of an investor, the two
were not connected. Thus, SLUSA is inapplicable here.
B. Implications and Policy Considerations
Regardless of the legal standard the Court applies, Chadbourne
will likely have serious consequences for both issuers of securities as
well as secondary defendants, like Chadbourne & Parke. There are
numerous policy arguments for and against holding SLUSA
inapplicable to SIB’s fraud, but ultimately the benefits of permitting
state law class actions in cases such as the one at hand outweigh the
costs.
On the one hand, affirming the decision of the Fifth Circuit would
likely increase the number of state law class actions filed against law
119
firms and other actors who advise issuers. This is particularly
117. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 3, at 22 (“[N]o plaintiff could have understood
that his or her individual purchase would necessarily lead SIB to buy securities traded on a U.S.
exchange.”). Defendants misrepresented their “general practice” to investors, but did not
“promise to use money from any particular plaintiff to buy anything.” See id. at 30. On the other
hand, had SIB promised to use investors’ money to purchase securities, then SIB would have
been making misrepresentations about its transactions in securities, and SLUSA would apply.
See, e.g., Barron v. Igolnikov, No. 09 Civ. 4471(TPG), 2010 WL 882890, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,
2010) (discussing Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, in which he told investors he would purchase covered
securities with their investments, then sent them falsified documentation of the transactions).
118. See supra Part V.A.
119. See Brief Amicus Curiae of DRI—the Voice of the Defense Bar in Support of
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problematic because class actions often seek to shift the entire cost of
120
a client’s fraudulent scheme to third-party actors, especially when
those directly involved in the fraud are insolvent, as is the case with
SIB. Furthermore, liability for aiding and abetting would raise the cost
121
of doing business for these third-party actors; this cost would be
122
passed on to clients, and ultimately investors.
Nonetheless, these considerations are offset by the policy benefits
of holding SLUSA inapplicable in cases such as this. First, because
claims for aiding and abetting fraud are not permitted under §
123
10(b), and because investors often can economically justify claims
only through class actions, a ruling that SLUSA applies might leave
investors without a method of aggregating claims against third-party
defendants. This would effectively relegate investors’ claims to a legal
124
“no man’s land” between federal and state law. Thus, to hold
SLUSA applicable here would deny investors a state law cause of
action in the name of furthering nationally uniform regulation,
when no comparable federal cause of action is available. Second, the
fraudulent representations made by SIB, which primarily involved
CDs, are not the type targeted by national securities legislation,
because they probably did not introduce dishonesty into national
markets. Generally, national securities laws serve to promote investor
confidence in two ways: by requiring certain disclosures so that
investors have sufficient information to determine the value of a
125
security, and by prohibiting false or misleading statements that
126
would cause an investor to misjudge the value of a security.

Petitioners at 2, Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. May 10,
2013).
120. See id.
121. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 163–64 (2008).
122. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
189 (1994) (discussing the implications of allowing private actions for aiding and abetting
securities fraud under Rule 10b-5).
123. See id. at 190.
124. See Brief of Sixteen Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 17,
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. July 24, 2013).
125. See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887,
1897–98 (2013) (“[T]he securities acts and implementing regulations require firms to disclose
relevant information about their financial condition, products and markets, management, and
competitive and regulatory climate.”).
126. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 386–87 (1990) (“According to the Court, section 10(b) proscribes
knowing and intentional misconduct designed to deceive or defraud investors.”).
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Here, by comparison, SIB never specifically indicated the
securities it planned to purchase or already held, nor did it make any
false statements about the transactions themselves, other than the fact
that they took place at all. Although such a claim is clearly fraudulent,
it likely would not harm market integrity because it is not a
misrepresentation that would cause investors to misevaluate the price
127
of a security.
Thus, although holding SLUSA inapplicable and permitting state
law class actions would potentially raise the cost of capital by thirdparty actors to increased liability, this cost is offset by the need to
provide some remedy—either at the federal or state level—to
plaintiffs who are legitimately harmed by a third-party’s assistance in
a fraud, especially when the defendant’s misrepresentations do not
introduce dishonesty into national markets, as is the case here. In light
of this, under whichever standard it adopts, the Court should hold
SLUSA inapplicable here and permit the state law class action to
proceed against Chadbourne & Parke.
VII. CONCLUSION
Chadbourne gives the Court the chance to clarify Dabit and to
address the application of SLUSA to fraudulent feeder fund
investment schemes. Because SIB’s misrepresentations were primarily
about its current securities holdings, and thus necessarily about
transactions that occurred in the past, it is difficult to say that the
misrepresentations were “in connection with” the purchase or sale of
any securities. Thus, the Court will likely rule that SLUSA is
inapplicable. The Court could reach this conclusion by further
elucidating the “coincides with” standard of Dabit or by adopting the
“not more than tangentially related to” standard used by the Fifth
Circuit. But either approach would be ill-advised as lower courts
would continue to struggle to interpret and consistently apply the
128
indeterminate language of either standard. Instead, the Court

127. As a counterexample, consider if an SIB employee stated that SIB had purchased $10
million in shares of X Corporation for its portfolio, because X Corporation was performing well
and SIB expected the value of the shares to appreciate. If this statement was false because the
purchase never took place and X Corporation was not expected to perform well, then this
misrepresentation would likely have introduced dishonesty into the national securities markets.
128. For the same reasons that lower courts struggled to interpret Dabit’s “coincides with”
requirement, it is unlikely that any of the standards crafted by the circuit courts, such as the
“more than tangentially related to” standard of Roland, would prove any easier for lower courts
to apply consistently. See supra Part III.C.
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should create a new standard for determining if the fraud in a feeder
fund investment scheme was “in connection with” covered securities.
Specifically, the Court should rule that when a defendant makes a
misrepresentation about its holdings in securities, SLUSA does not
apply. Under that standard, in Chadbourne the Court should find that
SLUSA is inapplicable and thus Respondents’ state law class action is
not precluded.

